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## Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD237, U.N. UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL VANESS DISCUSSES

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07BAGHDAD237**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">07BAGHDAD237</a>	<a href="#">2007-01-22 16:57</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Baghdad</a>

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2017  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [IZ](#)  
SUBJECT: U.N. UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL VANESS DISCUSSES  
STAFFING AND BASRAH

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 19 meeting, United Nations Undersecretary General (U/SG) for Safety and Security David C. Vanness and Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi discussed with the Ambassador UNAMI mission staffing, Basrah facilities, oil revenue sharing, and the new Baghdad security plan. End Summary.

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Staffing Should Be Driven By Mission, Not Security  
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¶2. (C) U/SG Vanness explained that at this time last year the UN prepared a report on security and engagement in Iraq. The focus was to determine how the UN would rely on the Government of Iraq (GOI) for security, once a conventional relationship emerges. However, since events did not unfold in 2006 as expected, they are now repeating the exercise. The new report will cover calendar year 2007.

¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked what will be the role of the UNAMI mission on the political side. He noted there is much more UNAMI can do, and expressed concern that UNAMI staffing was going in the wrong direction. SRSG Qazi needs to have the people to do the job, he stressed.

¶4. (C) U/SG Vanness confirmed that UNAMI would remain engaged on constitutional review, elections, and border disputes involving Kirkuk. The latter, he observed, must be resolved before provincial elections can be held. The Ambassador agreed and underlined their importance, since in some areas the Governing Councils are not representative of the local population.

¶5. (C) U/SG Vanness explained that the number of staff was driven by security considerations and the number of hardened living accommodations available (Note: UNAMI has 55 hardened living accommodations). The Ambassador pointed out that a staffing timeline for elections, constitution review, and Kirkuk is easily predicted.

¶6. (C) U/SG Vanness answered that staffing would follow as soon as they could provide extra shelters; they planned to move into their permanent facility in early 2008, a few months after the U.S. moves into its new embassy compound. The current staffing problem, U/SG Vanness continued, is temporary and short term. The Ambassador asked Vanness to think of ways in which the USG could be helpful.

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Revenue Sharing  
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¶7. (C) SRSG Qazi warned that although there is progress on the hydrocarbon law, legislation will not solve what he perceives to be a deep structural problem with the constitution: that any such revenue sharing laws, which are not enshrined in the constitution, are at risk of being either re-written by subsequent legislation or in effect overruled by regional laws. The constitution review process needs to reflect and memorialize the current revenue sharing compromises.

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Terrorists Should Not Push Us Out of Basrah  
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¶8. (C) U/SG Vanness inquired about our plans for Basrah - if there is a way for the U.S. to stay in the palace, they would very much like to participate. The Ambassador explained that strategically, we want a significant presence in Iraq's south. For example, Najaf is especially important as the center of Shia religious leadership and for its strong ties to Iran. As for Basrah, the Ambassador explained that the USG is in discussions with our British colleagues about whether to stay in the palace. Abandoning the palace under

terrorist pressure would not be a good signal to send the terrorists, he pointed out. U/SG Veness agreed that moving to the Basrah Air Station would not be good for the long term.

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Baghdad Security Plan  
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19. (C) U/SG Veness asked whether the new Baghdad security plan would create the political space everyone needs. The Ambassador outlined the key highlights: pursue lawbreakers with no sanctuary, no GOI political interference with the rules of engagement, and political, economic and services

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components in addition to the security effort. Operations are now allowed against senior militia leaders, and we are focusing on the Syrian and Iranian networks. This is not a narrow security plan, but a comprehensive stabilization plan. U/SG Veness hoped the next several months would be favorable.  
KHALILZAD